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Many  countries,  such  as  the  United  States,  India  and  China,  have  seen  increased  levels  
of   economic   inequality   in   recent  decades.   In   contrast,   as   an   IMF  study  argues,   “Brazil  
reduced   inequality  significantly   from  the  early  1990s   through  a   focused  set  of   transfer  
programs   that   have   become   a  model   for  many   around   the  world.”  Martin   Ravallion,  
Director   of   the  Development  Research  Group   of   the  World   Bank,   argues   that   Brazil’s  
growth  has   been   less   impressive   than   that   of   fast-­‐‑growing  nations   such   as  China   and  
India,2   yet   he   claims   Brazil   has  much   to   teach   those   countries   in   terms   of   inequality  
reduction  (Ravallion,  2010).    
The   Brazilian   case   is   striking   because   some   authors   say   that   federal   systems  
induce  and  perpetuate   inequality,  whereas  Brazilians  were  able   to  significantly  reduce  
inequality   in   recent   years.   How   was   this   possible   since   it   contradicts   the   alleged  
inequality  trends  of  federal  systems?  To  answer  this  question,  we  have  to  keep  in  mind  
that  federalism  is  a  broad  concept.  Federal  systems  implement  many  different  policies.  
Some  policies  might  improve  inequality  while  others  might  make  it  worse.  The  Brazilian  
case,  however,  illustrates  that  it  is  possible  to  have  a  federal  system  and  at  the  same  time  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1The author wrote this article as part of the Federalism and Inequality in the Global South Project, an initiative 
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2Similarly to the Chinese and Indian growth of today, Brazil also grew around two digits annually during the 
presidency of Emílio Garrastazu Médici (1969-1973). This period is known as the Brazilian economic miracle (or 
“milagre econômico brasileiro”).  
 








reduce   inequality.   Of   course,   Brazil   is   still   one   of   the   most   unequal   countries   in   the  
world,  but  there  is  still  plenty  of  space  for  improvement.  
Social  policies   targeting  the  poor,  such  as  Bolsa  Família,  are  an   important  cause  
for  the  reduction  of  inequality  in  Brazil.  The  Luiz  Inácio  “Lula”  da  Silva  administration  
is  responsible  for  taking  many  Brazilians  out  of  poverty  through  its  social  policies.  Social  
policies  are  tools  for  reducing  inequality,  but  they  are  not  the  only  ones.  Multiple  paths  
lead   to   inequality.   Here   we   focus   only   on   inequality   as   an   outcome   of   some   public  
policies,  especially  collection  of  taxes,  conditional  cash-­‐‑transfer  programs  and  spending  
on  education.  There  are  still  many  complaints  about  how  Brazilian  taxes  favor  the  rich.  
For   that   reason,  we   also   focus   on   the   less   debated   but   equally   important   relationship  
between   the   Brazilian   tax   system   and   inequality   reduction.   We   discuss   how   federal  
spending   toward   the   poor   has   helped   to   reduce   inequality   in   Brazil,  whereas   the   tax  
system  has  been  an  obstacle   in   turning  Brazil   into  a  more  equal  and  efficient  country.  
We  also   show   that,  while  Brazil  has   invested  more  on  education,   there   is   still   a   lot  of  
room  for  improvement.    
The   typology  of   inter-­‐‑jurisdictional   transfers3  we  propose   –   inequality   reducing  
transfers,   status   quo   (or   ambiguous)   maintaining   transfers,   and   inequality   increasing  
transfers  –  assume  that  it  is  possible  to  counter-­‐‑balance  the  potential  harmful  effects  of  
federal   systems   (e.g.   higher   inequality)   while   preserving   its   potential   positive   effects  
(e.g.  higher  economic  growth).  We  believe  that  the  Brazilian  case  brings  lessons  to  other  
countries   that   also   wish   to   reduce   inequality.   Reforming   federalism   is   easier   in   a  
democratic   system   than   replacing   it.   The   1988   Brazilian   Constitution,   for   instance,  
establishes   federalism   as   an   entrenched   clause.   Thus,   studies   that   discuss   ways   to  
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There may be inter-jurisdictional transfers aimed directly toward individuals (such as Bolsa Família and social 
security) or induced by the tax system (such as source taxation). 
 








reform   federalism   are   more   useful   from   the   policy   point   of   view   than   the   ones   that  
criticize  federalism  without  proposing  a  clear  solution  to  their  critiques.    
  
Federalism  and  Inequality  
  
Many  historical  institutionalists  work  at  the  level  of  mid-­‐‑range  theories  (Rueschemeyer,  
Stephens,  &  Stephens,  1992;  Karl,  1997).  They  empirically  test,  refine  and  generate  new  
theories   and   hypothesis   focusing   on   a   limited   number   of   case   studies   (Skocpol,   1979;  
Collier   &   Collier,   1991).   The   issue   of   micro-­‐‑foundations   is   typically   cited   as  
distinguishing  historical   institutionalism   from   rational   choice   institutionalism   (Thelen,  
1999,  p.  367).  Rational  choice  focuses  on  the  individual’s  strategic  actions  and  behaviors.  
In   contrast,   historical   institutionalism   analyzes  macro-­‐‑historical   phenomena   and   large  
social   transformations   (Tilly,   2006;   Pierson,   2004).   Clearly,   microanalysis   does   not  
preclude   dealing   with   collectivities,   since   many   rational   choice   works   deal   with  
collective   actors   (Olson,   1965;   Bates,   Greif,   Levi,   &   Rosenthal,   1998).   Our   main  
contribution  toward  this  debate  is  to  reinforce  the  idea  that  endogenous  and  incremental  
public   policy   reforms   can  have   a   large  macro-­‐‑impact   in   terms  of   inequality   reduction  
over  time.  
Moreover,   an   influential   body   of   literature   says   that   federalism   induces  
inequality   between   different   regions   and   citizens   within   a   nation-­‐‑state.   As  Wildasky  
(1986)   argues,   “Uniformity   is   antithetical   to   federalism.   The   existence   of   states   free   to  
disagree   with   one   another   and   with   the   central   government   inevitably   leads   to  
differentiation.”  The  outcome  is  driven  by  the  following  mechanism:  federal  institutions  
implement   a   varied   set   of   public   policies   and   also   taxes   subnational   units   differently.  
Competition   between   subnational   governments   for   better   public   policies   might   help  
economic  growth,  but  also  creates  inequality  (Buchanan,  1995;  Weingast,  1995).  Federal  








institutions   are   seen   as   economic  markets   where   individuals   and   firms   freely   choose  
where  to  establish  themselves  or  where  to  allocate  their  resources  to  get  better  services  
and  taxes.  If  they  are  not  happy  with  their  location,  they  can  move  elsewhere.  A  “federal  
market”   is   commonly   flawed.   There   are   asymmetries   of   resources   and   information  
inside  a  country,  where  lower  class  individuals  and  small  firms  tend  to  have  less  free-­‐‑
will   than   richer   individuals   and   larger   firms.   As   in   a   market   economy,   inequality  
between  individuals  and  firms  is  an  outcome  of  the  competition  between  unequal  parts.  
Inequalities  accumulate  unless  institutions  and  policies  are  designed  to  reduce  them.    
Sometimes   federalism   presents   a   barrier   to   implement   much-­‐‑needed   public  
policies.   Wibbels   (2000)   argues   that   federalism   adversely   affects   the   macroeconomic  
performance  of  countries.  Both  federal  and  subnational  units  diverge  in  terms  of  desired  
public  policies.  For  example,   the  federal  government  wants  to  reform  its   tax  system  to  
reach  a  fiscal  balance,  whereas  subnational  governments  boycott  the  reform  because  few  
local   businessmen   oppose   it   out   of   self-­‐‑interest.   Contrarily,   subnational   governments  
also  limit  “bad”  policies  coming  from  the  Union.  
A  more  nuanced  view  says  that  federalism  tends  to  produce  inequalities  between  
regions  and  citizens  within  a  nation-­‐‑state,  but  centralization  of  policy  decision-­‐‑making  
in   certain   areas,   such   as   public   health,   can   counter-­‐‑balance   inequalities   produced   by  
federal  institutions  (Obinger,  Leibfried,  &  Castles,  2005;  Banting  &  Corbett,  2002).  If  this  
is   true,   it   is   possible   to   combine   federal   competition   that   enhances   economic  
development  with  public  policies  that  help  the  poorest  segments  of  society.  Institutions  
interact  with  other  factors  that  shape  policy  choices  and  social  outcomes.  States,  such  as  
Germany  and  Canada,  are  able  to  combine  federalism  with  public  policies  that  counter-­‐‑
balance  “inequality  inducing  federalist  institutions”  (Linz  &  Stepan,  2000).  Banting  and  
Corbett   (2002)  also  point  out   that  “federal  states   tend  to  resemble  non-­‐‑federal  ones,   in  








which   inequalities  are   less  marked  across   regions   than  between  urban  and  rural  areas  
within  regions”.    
Much   in   line  with   the  arguments  presented   in   this  paper,  Beramendi   (2012,   10)  
says  that  the  view  that  federalism  induces  inequality  has  its  limits.  There  is  a  trade-­‐‑off  
between  the  pursuit  of  equality  and  the  protection  of  political  autonomy  of  subnational  
units  in  a  federal  system.  Political  units  organize  their  fiscal  systems  according  to  one  of  
three  designs:  a  centralized  design   (C),   in  which  national  governments  control   income  
taxes,  transfers  and  the  allocation  of  resources  across  regions  (e.g.  Spain  in  the  aftermath  
of  its  democratic  transition);  a  decentralized  design  (D),  in  which  regions  control  income  
transfers   and   taxes   and   there   is   little   redistribution   between   regions   (the   European  
Union);  and,   finally,  a  hybrid  design   (H),   in  which  a  partially  decentralized  system  of  
interpersonal   redistribution   coexists   with   significant   levels   of   interregional  
redistribution  (Germany  during  the  post-­‐‑war  period).  
Our  article   contributes   to  a  more   fine-­‐‑grained  view  of   the   relationship  between  
federalism   and   inequality.   Brazil   has   combined   relatively   high   levels   of   economic  
growth  with  the  reduction  of  social   inequalities.  Brazil’s   federal  spending  has  targeted  
the   poor,   but   the   country   has   a   complex   tax   system   that   perpetuates   inequality.   The  
recent   reduction   of   social   inequalities   in   Brazil   is  motivated  mainly   by   social   policies  
(such  as  Bolsa  Família  –  a  conditional  cash  transfer  program),  but  much  remains  to  be  
done  in  other  areas.  Brazil  has  to  further  reform  its  economic  and  political  institutions  in  




As   Figure   1   shows,   the   socioeconomic   history   of   Brazil   in   the   last   50   years   can   be  
characterized   by   three   distinct   periods.   The   first   (1960-­‐‑80)   encompasses   most   of   the  








Brazilian  military  dictatorship  (1964-­‐‑1985).  During  this  period,  the  country  experienced  
rapid   per   capita   income   growth.   The   pioneering   works   of   Williamson   (1965)   and  
Kuznets   (1955)   show   that   the   beginning   of   the   industrialization   and   urbanization  
process  concentrates  income.  Beyond  the  typical  effects  of  the  Brazilian  infant  industry  
on   inequality,   the  military   government   gave   low  priority   to   social   spending.   The   real  
value  of  the  minimum  wage  (minus  inflation)  dropped  1.6%  on  average  per  year,  from  
1964  to  1980  (Pochmann,  2011),  thanks  to  the  military’s  belief  that  economic  growth  was  
mainly   driven   by   investments   in   physical   capital   –   not   in   human   capital   (Pastore   &  
Zylberstain,  1990;  Barros,  Carvalho,  Franco,  &  Rosalem,  2012).  
  
Figure   1:  Historical  Evolution  of  National   and  Personal   Income  per   capita   (Gini)  
between  1960  and  2009  (1960  =  100  
  
Source:  Based  on  Pochmann  (2011),  IBGE.  
  
From  the  federalist  standpoint,  the  military  sharply  reduced  the  autonomy  of  both  states  
and  municipalities  to  concentrate  resources  in  the  hands  of  the  Union.  For  example,  the  
central  government   transferred  only  5%  of   income  tax  and   the  same  5%  of   the   federal  








value-­‐‑added   tax   (VAT)   to   states   and  municipalities.  Note   that,   in   1967,   Brazil   became  
one  of  the  first  countries  in  the  world  to  adopt  VAT.  Two  VATs  were  created:  one  at  the  
federal   level   and   the  other   at   the   state   level.  Even   the  delivery  of   these   transfers  only  
occurred   after   a   series   of   requirements   had  been   imposed  by   the   central   government.  
The   Union   could   define   subnational   tax   rates,   the   collection   of   taxes   of   subnational  
governments  and  subnational   tax  exemptions.  The  tax  reform  of  1967  was  designed  to  
allow  maximum  economic  growth.  The  Union  controlled  the  federal  distribution  of  tax  
instruments.   This   tax   centralization   allowed   the   federal   government   the   freedom   and  
flexibility  to  create  incentives  for  development.  The  Brazilian  military  regime  shows  that  
centralization   does   not   necessarily   lead   to   greater   equity.   By   creating   two   VATs,   the  
military  transferred  resources  from  poor  regions  and  individuals  to  wealthy  regions  and  
individuals  in  order  to  promote  industrialization.  
Another   important   innovation   was   the   creation   of   the   state   VAT,   replacing  
multiple  state  taxes  that  existed  until  then.  The  tax  adjustment  was  uniform  throughout  
the  country  and  was  fully  charged  by  the  producing  state,   favoring  industrialized  and  
richer  states,  such  as  São  Paulo.    
The   second   period   (1980-­‐‑1994)   goes   from   the   last   military   government   to   the  
administration  of  President   Itamar  Franco.  This  period   is  marked  by   strong   economic  
and  political  instability.  Brazil  had  low  economic  growth  and  maintained  its  high  level  
of   social   and   regional   inequalities.   Civilian   governments   sought   to   increase   social  
spending,   but  high   inflation   and   fiscal  deficits  prevented   stronger  government   action.  
The  new  1988  Constitution  was  the  most  important  event  in  the  period.  It  created  new  
social   rights,   such   as   universal   and   free   health   care,   retirement   for   rural  workers   (the  
previous   system  was   only   effective   for   urban  workers),   and   aid   to   disabled  workers.  
There  was   a   strong  decentralization   of   revenue   because   states   and  municipalities   had  
the   right   to   45%   of   income   tax   and   federal   VAT   (22.5%   for   states   and   22.5%   for  








municipalities).   The   Union   was   forbidden   to   withhold   or   impose   conditions   on   the  
above-­‐‑mentioned   transfers,   which   began   to   be   fully   controlled   by   subnational  
governments.   The   Union   also   strengthened   subnational   taxes.   Many   high   value  
products   that  were   taxed   exclusively  by   federal   taxes   became  part   of   the   state  VAT  –  
such  as  electric  power,  mining,  fuel,  transport,  and  communication  (Varsano,  1997).  
Nowadays,   the   central   government   has   little   room   to   intervene   in   subnational  
taxes.   The   new   Constitution   has   prohibited,   for   example,   that   the   Union   grants  
exemptions   or   tax   concessions   with   subnational   taxes.   States   began   to   enjoy   great  
autonomy,  using  tax  breaks  to  attract  investments,  in  what  has  been  described  as  a  “tax  
war”  or  “race  to  the  bottom”4  (Prado  &  Cavalcanti,  2000).  Municipalities  also  benefited  
from  the  increase  in  transfers.  In  addition  to  the  aforementioned  federal  transfers,  they  
had  the  right  to  25%  of  state  VAT.  The  legislators  of  the  1988  Constitution  believed  that  
the   previous   system   was   too   centralized,   causing   strong   financial   dependence   upon  
local   levels   of   government.   Consequently,   the   1988   Constitution   promoted   strong  
revenue  decentralization.    
The  1988  Constitution  also  created  the  Social  Security  Budget,   its  aim  to  finance  
health,   social   security   and   welfare.   It   consists   of   tax   instruments   called   “social  
contributions.”   Social   contributions   are   taken   from   company   profits,   its   earnings   and  
formal  workers’  wages.  Unlike   taxes,   they  are  an  exclusivity  of   the  Union  and  are  not  
shared  with  states  and  municipalities.  The  1988  Constitution  says  that   the  Union  must  
share   20%   of   any   tax   that   it   creates  with   states,   but   the   rule   does   not   apply   to   social  
contributions.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4Tax war or race to the bottom is a socio-economic phenomenon in which governments deregulate the business 
environment or taxes to attract or retain economic activity in their jurisdictions. 
 








Finally,   the   last   period   goes   from   1994   to   the   present.   Economic   stability  
following   the  Real  plan   immediately   created  a   sharp  drop   in   inequality  by   recovering  
the   purchasing  power   of   low  paid  workers.   Income  growth,   however,   only   started   to  
gain  momentum  after  2004,  the  second  year  of  the  Lula  government,  when  there  was  a  
sharp  drop  in  inequality.  According  to  Neri  and  Souza  (2012),  average  income  grew  by  
40%  between  1996  and  2011,  with  Brazil  being  one  of   the   few  countries  where   income  
grew  faster  than  the  GDP  per  capita  (27.7%).  Growth,  however,  was  not  uniform  across  
all  income  levels.  Unlike  the  global  trend  of  rising  inequality  (APSA,  2008),  Brazil  is  less  
unequal  because  the  income  of  the  poorest  increased  proportionately  more  than  that  of  
the  richest.  The  income  of  the  poorest  10%  grew  by  91.2%  from  1996  to  2011,  similar  to  
the  Indian  income  growth  in  the  same  period,  while  the  income  of  the  richest  10%  rose  
to   16.6%.  The  Brazilian  Gini   index   fell   by  12%,  going   from  0.5987   in  1995   to  0.5274   in  
2011.   As   a   result,   the   Sen’s   social   welfare   function   (Sen,   1997),   which   measures   the  
increase  in  income  multiplied  by  the  Gini  index,  increased  by  65.12%.  
  
Figure  2:  Growth  by  Household  Income  Per  Capita  Divided  into  10  Income  Groups   in  
Brazil  (2001-­‐‑2011)    









Source:  Neri  and  Souza  (2012),  PNAD.  
  
Growth  in  Brazil  favored  almost  all  vulnerable  groups  (Neri  &  Souza,  2012).  The  income  
of  Afro-­‐‑Brazilians  and  mixed-­‐‑Brazilians   (whites  and  blacks)  grew  by  66.3%  and  85.5%  
respectively,   from   1996   to   2001,   while   that   of   whites   increased   by   47.6%.   Household  
incomes  headed  by  illiterate  providers  increased  by  88.6%.  Household  incomes  headed  
by  those  who  have  12  or  more  years  of  education  increased  by  11.1%.  The  Northeast  (the  
country’s   poorest   region)   grew   by   72.8%.   The   richer   Southeast   grew   by   45.8%.  
Agricultural,  domestic  and   informal  workers  –  historically   ill-­‐‑paid   jobs  –   increased  by  
86%,   62.4%   and   60.3%   respectively.   From   1995   to   2011,   Brazil’s   GDP   grew   by   3.15%.  
From   2003   to   2011,   the   period   that   coincides   with   most   of   the   Lula’s   administration  
(2003-­‐‑2010),  Brazil’s  growth  routinely  surpassed  that  of  the  world  (see  Figure  3).  In  2010,  
Brazil’s   growth   reached   its   peak   of   7.53%   (World   Bank,   2013).   More   important   than  








economic   growth   itself,   Brazil   has   recently   shown   a   great   ability   to   turn   wealth   into  
well-­‐‑being  by  reducing  inequality.  
  
Figure  3:  Annual  GDP  Growth  Rates  (%)  -­‐‑  Brazil  versus  World  
  
      Source:  World  Bank  (2013).  
  
One   aspect   that   calls   attention   when   Brazil   is   compared   to   other   federations   is   the  
composition   of   revenues   of   Brazilian   municipalities.   Revenues   collected   in  
municipalities   represent   20%   of   their   total   revenues,  while   federal   and   state   transfers  
represent  65%  of  municipalities’   revenues.  The   ratio  of   its  own  revenues  and   the   total  
revenues  in  Canada  in  the  same  period  was  43%  and  the  ratio  between  transfer  and  total  
revenues  was  39%.  In  Australia  (2001),  they  were  38%  and  17%.  In  Germany  (2002),  the  
ratios   were   37%   and   35%   (Arvate,   Mattos,   &   Rocha,   2013).   Therefore,   balancing  








economic   growth   and   social   equality   is   not   an   impossible   task,   albeit   a   difficult   one.  
Therefore,  we  have  to  create  incentives  within  the  federal  system  to  counter-­‐‑balance  the  
federal  tendency  to  generate  inequality,  since  replacing  federalism  with  other  forms  of  
government  is  a  much  more  difficult  task.  
  
Case  Studies  and  Typology  
  
In   recent   years,   Brazil   has   combined   relatively   high   economic   growth  with   inequality  
reduction  (The  Economist,  2011;  Berg  &  Ostry,  2011;  Ravallion,  2010).  Brazil  stands  out  
as  an  important  outlier  in  terms  of  inequality  reduction  between  BRIC  nations  (Russia,  
India   and   China)   (Canuto,   2013)   and   in   comparison  with   developed   countries   as   the  
United  States  (Atkinson  &  Stiglitz,  1980;  Piketty  &  Saez,  2003).  Of  course,  Brazil  is  still  a  
highly  unequal   society   and  Brazilians  have   to  overcome  many  obstacles   to   remain  on  
the   same  path.   Brazil   has   to   reinforce   its   inequality   reduction   trajectory   if   it  wants   to  
continue   reducing   inequality.  After  all,  public  policy   changes  have  a   limited   temporal  
effect.  
We   selected   cases   in   an   inequality   reducing   scale:   decreasing   inequality,  
preserving   the   status   quo,   and   increasing   inequality.   Federal   transfers   are   our  
independent  variable  and  their  impact  on  social  inequality  is  our  dependent  variable.  In  
this   paper,   Bolsa   Família   is   our   best   example   of   an   inequality   reducing   transfer,  
followed   by   the   changes   in   Brazilian   public   spending   with   regards   to   education.  
Unconditional   transfers   present   ambiguous   results   in   terms   of   inequality   reduction.  
Finally,   the   Brazilian   tax   system   is   a   major   source   of   inequality.   In   Brazil,   the   most  
efficient   inequality   reducing   transfers   are   directed   toward   individuals,   rather   than  
regions.  Bolsa  Família  is  a  good  example.  Poor  regions  have  a  higher  proportion  of  low  
class   individuals   among   its   inhabitants.   As   a   result,   fighting   inequality   between  








individuals   helps   to   reduce   inequality   between   subnational   units.   The   Brazilian   tax  
system,  on   the  other  hand,   is   a   cumbersome  and  complex   inter-­‐‑governmental   transfer  
that   promotes   unequal   competition   between   subnational   units   (“tax   war”)   to   attract  
company  investments,  since  subnational  units  collect  taxes  at  the  source.    
With  our  research  design,  we  cannot  overstretch  our  conclusions  to  other  federal  
countries   (Goertz,   2006;   Sartori,   1970).   As   our   hypothesis   was   generated   using   non-­‐‑
random  case  studies  sampled  from  a  single  political  system,  further  analysis  (employing  
other  methodologies,   such   large-­‐‑N   studies)   are   necessary   to   test   the   generalization   of  
our  conclusions  against  other  political  systems.  Selecting  subnational  cases  allows  us  to  
increase   the   number   of   observations   and   to   have  more   controlled   comparisons,   since  
they   are   extracted   from   the   same   political   unit,   where   there   is   less   context   variation  
(Snyder  2001).  With  a  subnational  comparison,  we  can  therefore  mitigate  problems  that  
are   characteristic  of   a   small-­‐‑N   research  design   (King,  Keohane  and  Verba  1994).  More  
importantly,  we  want  to  build  a  framework  of  analysis  and  we  expect  that  researchers  
make  adjustments  when  applying  our  framework  to  other  countries.     
Inequality   reducing   public   policies   are   important   in   a   federal   system,  which   is  
said   to   create   economic   growth   at   the   expense   of   higher   inequality.   In   recent   years,  
Brazil   was   able   to   reduce   inequality   to   a   large   extent   because   it   reformed   its   federal  
system   implementing   inequality-­‐‑reducing   transfers,   such   as   Bolsa   Família,   National  
Education  Funds  and  National  Health  Services.  Most  transfers  can  be  improved,  better  
administered  and  monitored,  this,  however,  goes  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper.  Figure  
4  shows  the  relationship  between  federal  transfers  and  social  inequality  within  a  federal  
system  –  that  is  said  to  generate  social  inequality.    
Figure  4:  Balancing  Federalism  and  Equality  









     
  
Probably   the   most   powerful   single   explanation   for   inequality   reduction   in   the  
framework  of  the  Brazilian  federal  system  is  related  to  the  changing  nature  of  Brazilian  
public   spending   in   the   last  decade.   In   the  next   section,  we   examine  different   types   of  
federal  transfers  (or  public  spending)  and  their  consequences  on  inequality.  
  
Reducing  Inequality  through  Social  Spending  
  
The  1988  Constitution  established  a  “division  of  labor”  within  Brazilian  federalism:  the  
federal   government   takes   care   of   targeted   public   spending   and   subnational  
governments  deal  with  universal  services.  The  division  of  labor  mitigates  the  problem  of  
race   to   the   bottom  within   the   federation   (Peterson   &   Rom,   1990;   Peterson   P.   ,   1995),  
because   social   programs   funded   by   the   federal   government   aid   the   poor.   Per   capita  
social  spending  more  than  doubled  from  1995  to  2009,  rising  from  11.24%  to  15.80%  of  
the  GDP.  From  1995  to  2009,  spending  on  retirement  and  pensions  increased  by  156%,  
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from  5%  to  7.28%  of  the  GDP  (Castro,  Mostafa,  &  Souza,  2011).  The  increase  in  spending  
happened   because   of   the   increase   in   the  minimum  wage,  which   corresponds   to   two-­‐‑
thirds  of  all  retirement  pensions  and  benefits  to  workers  unable  to  work.  During  2009,  
only   3%   of   the   extremely   poor  were   retired   and   less   than   1%  were   employed   in   the  
formal  sector  (IPEA,  2011).    
The   greatest   innovation   in   terms   of   social   spending   in   Brazil   is   Bolsa   Família,  
which  transfers  benefits  to  poor  families  according  to  the  number  of  members,  provided  
that   families’  children  attend  school  and   take  vaccines   (Soares,  Ribas,  &  Osório,  2010).  
Women   are   the   holders   of   the   benefit,   causing   abrupt   changes   in   poor   families’  
patriarchal  gender   relations.  Similar  programs   to  Bolsa  Família  were  pioneered  by   the  
municipality   of   Campinas   in   1994,   under   mayor   José   Roberto   Magalhães   Teixeira  
(PSDB),  and  by  the  Federal  District  (Brasília),  under  governor  Cristovam  Buarque  (PT)  
(Ferro  &  Kassouf,  2005).  The  Cardoso  administration  brought  the  program  to  the  federal  
government,   and   the   Lula   government   gave   it   its   current   format.  Municipalities   and  
states  register  the  beneficiary  families.  As  the  resources  and  norms  of  Bolsa  Família  are  
from  the  federal  government,  we  do  not  have  the  problem  of  race  to  the  bottom.  Federal  
spending  on  social  policy  programs,  including  Bolsa  Família,  grew  from  0.08%  in  1995  
to  1.08%  of  the  GDP  in  2009,  a  2,212.50%  increase  (Castro,  Mostafa,  &  Souza,  2011).  Bolsa  
Família   alone   reached   about   0.4%   of   the   GDP   in   2011.   Experts   estimate   that   Bolsa  
Família  was  responsible  for  13%  of  Brazil’s  fall  in  inequality,  i.e.,  a  0.009  drop  in  the  Gini  
coefficient  between  2001  and  2011  (Neri  &  Souza,  2012).  
  
Public  Spending  on  Education  
  
The   1998   Constitutional   reform   changed   education   spending   in   Brazil.   The   federal  
government  began  to  withhold  part  of  the  unconditional  funds  transferred  to  states  and  








municipalities,   restricting   its   release   to   school   enrollment.  National   education   funds   –  
the   Fundef   from   1998   to   2006   and   Fundeb,   starting   in   2007   –   were   created   by   a  
constitutional   amendment.  Each   state   fund   receives   federal   transfers   and   redistributes  
the   capital   according   to   the   number   of   students   in   each   government   (either   state   or  
municipality).  As  a  result,  the  federal  government  transformed  part  of  the  unconditional  
transfers   into   conditional   transfers.   The   transformation   created   a   competition   for  
resources  between  states  and  their  respective  municipalities.  Competition  allows  that  a  
certain  level  of  government  divert  resources  from  another  level  so  that  the  first  level  can  
increase   enrollments   quickly.   The   practical   consequence   of   the   policy   was   the  
universalization   of   basic   education   enrollments   (Bruns,   Evans,  &   Luque,   2012).   There  
was   another   reform   in   2006.   The   politics   of   education   funds   changed   the   payoffs   of  
subnational  governments,  making  the  creation  of  school  places  a  source  of  revenue.  The  
2006   reform   increased   the   amount   of   withheld   resources   for   education   funds   and  
expanded  its  reach  to  early  childhood  education  (up  to  six  years  old)  and  high  schools.  
In  addition,  the  federal  government  supplemented  the  poorer  states’  education  budget  
to   make   them   achieve   a   national   minimum   spending   per   student.   The   national  
education   fund   is   the   only  Brazilian   intergovernmental   redistribution   fund  with   truly  
equalizing   criteria.   The   education   funds   work   as   follows:   the   government   allocates  
resources   to   a   state   fund   according   to   a   ranking   of   each   state'ʹs   monetary   value   per  
student,  favoring  those  states  that  have  lower  values.  The  process  is  repeated  until  the  
government  spends  all  of  its  annual  resources  for  state  funds.  Therefore,  the  poorer  the  
State   is,   the   greater   the   federal   government   supplementation   of   those   poorer   states’  
education   budgets   is.   The   new   dynamics   of   federal   education   transfers   caused   a   fast  
increase   in   federal   spending.   From   2006   to   2009,   federal   spending   on   education  
increased  by  48.94%,  from  0.81%  to  1.03%  of  the  GDP  (Castro,  Mostafa,  &  Souza,  2011).  








The  national  education  fund  is  one  of  the  most  successful  Brazilian  public  policies  
of   the   last   few   decades.   However,   it   still   has   many   problems.   As   resources   were  
redistributed  according   to  a  simple  quantitative  criterion   (the  number  of  enrollments),  
improving  the  quality  of  education  was  secondary.  Despite  the  inclusion  of  virtually  all  
children  in  schools,  the  quality  of  education  in  Brazil  is  still  very  poor  (Bruns,  Evans,  &  
Luque,   2012).   Current   Brazilian   growth   has   benefited   from   the   increasing   number   of  
somewhat  educated  workers  that  have  recently  entered  the  labor  market.  After  all,  it  is  
better  to  have  some  education  than  no  education  at  all.  Education  funds  were  one  of  the  
main   reasons   for   the   improvement  of   the  Brazilian   education   system.  Nowadays,   it   is  
common  sense  in  Brazil  that  the  country  has  to  improve  the  quality  of  its  education  to  
sustain   its   current   economic   growth.   If   not,   Brazil   will   have   a   shortage   of   educated  
people  in  strategic  areas  for  development,  such  as  engineering  and  medical  science.  
  
Unconditional  Transfers:  Keeping  the  Status  Quo  
  
Another   characteristic   of   Brazil’s   federalism   is   the   unconditional   intergovernmental  
transfers.  They  have  grown  substantially  since   the  1988  Constitution.   It   reached  6%  of  
the  GDP  in  2006   (Mendes,  Miranda,  &  Cosio,  2008).  Because  of   ill-­‐‑defined  rules   in   the  
distribution   of   resources,   they  have  had   limited   impact   on   inequality   reduction  when  
compared   to   social   spending.   The   largest   fund   of   unconditional   transfer   to   states  
consists   of   22.5%   of   both   value-­‐‑added   tax   and   federal   income   tax.   The   rule   for  
distribution  of  resources  between  states  should  have  been  established  in  1989  –  one  year  
after   the   promulgation   of   the   new  Constitution.   Legislators,   however,  were   unable   to  
reach   an   agreement   on   the   rule.  As   a   result,   the   percentage   of   the   previous   year  was  
established   as   a   temporary   distributional   rule   until   they   agree   on   a   better   criterion.  
Figure   5   shows   the   Brazilian   states   ranked   according   to   their   per   capita   revenue.   In  








Figure  5,  we  can  also  compare  state  revenue  before  and  after  government  transfers.  We  
can  see  that  the  end  result  of  distributions  favors  circled  states  with  average  per  capita  
revenue,  rather  than  low  per  capita  revenue  states.  For  example,  the  respectively  poorer  
states   in  Figure  5,  Maranhão   (MA),  Piauí   (PI),  Alagoas   (AL),  Ceará   (CE),  Paraíba   (PB),  
Pará   (PA),   Bahia   (BA)   and   Pernambuco   (PE)   have   benefited   less   than   Sergipe   (SE),  
Tocantins  (TO),  Roraima  (RR),  Acre  (AC)  and  Rondônia  (RO).  As  expected,  richer  states  
such   as   Rio   de   Janeiro   (RJ)   and   São   Paulo   (SP)   have   not   benefited   much   from   the  
transfers.    
  
Figure  5:  Per  capita  Federal  Spending  and  State  Revenue  
  
Source:  (Prado  S.  ,  2012).  
  
As  for  municipalities,  the  criterion  for  resource  distribution  of  federal  transfers,  created  
in   1967,   provides   more   resources   per   capita   to   municipalities   with   less   population.  








Regardless  of  their  level  of  development,  large  cities  receive  fewer  resources  per  capita  
and  small  municipalities  receive  more  resources  per  capita.  As  a  result,  the  distribution  
of  resources   is  neutral  regarding  the  HDI  (Human  Development   Index),  which  creates  
great   social   injustices   by   benefiting   rich   small  municipalities   and   punishing   poor   big  
ones  (Mendes,  Miranda,  &  Cosio,  2008).    
State   transfers   to  municipalities  are  composed  of  25%  state  value-­‐‑added  tax.  As  
75%   of   the   amount   must   be   distributed   according   to   the   value   generated   in   the  
jurisdiction   of   the   municipality.   State   value-­‐‑added   tax   has   become   highly   regressive.  
Most   industrialized   cities,   especially   those  with   a   small   population,   benefit   the  most.  
The   poorest   municipalities   are   penalized.   Mendes,   Miranda   and   Cosio   (2008,   p.   49)  
showed  that  the  higher  the  HDI,  the  greater  the  chance  of  municipalities  receiving  state  
transfers.   As   a   consequence,   state   transfers   increase   regional   inequality,   rather   than  
decreasing  it.  
Oil  royalties  have  the  same  effect.  During  1988,  the  Brazilian  government  started  
to   charge   royalties   to   compensate   for   the   environmental   damage   caused   by   oil  
extraction.   Royalties   were   either   intended   for   producer   states   or  municipalities.   Such  
transfers  have  grown  enormously  in  recent  years.  New  oil  reserves  were  discovered  and  
the  government  taxed  the  oil  sector  even  more.  The  values  generated  by  such  transfers  
became  massive.  They  also  became  a  significant  portion  of  the  revenue  of  some  states,  
especially  in  Rio  de  Janeiro  and  Espírito  Santo.  The  effect  of  royalties  benefited  only  two  
already   rich   states   and   a   few  municipalities.   There   is   also   evidence   that   oil   resources  
neither   ameliorate   social   indicators   nor   the   environmental   management   of   recipient  
governments.   They   were   basically   appropriated   by   local   elites   (Afonso,   Soares,   &  
Castro,  2013).  
Finally,   high   unconditional   transfer   volumes   create   negative   incentives   on   the  
behavior   of   subnational   governments.   Unconditional   transfers   tend   to   diminish   the  








accountability  and  fiscal  responsibility  of  governments  that  do  not  have  to  do  much  for  
getting   their  money   from   federal   transfers   (flypaper   effect).   They   also   discourage   the  
efficient   management   of   resources,   because   they   reduce   the   symmetry   between   local  
contributions   and   local   public   benefits   (Wyckoff,   1988;   Strumpf,   1998).   Therefore,  
besides  their  limited  redistributive  effect,  unconditional  transfers  may  be  hindering  the  
efficiency  of  the  Brazilian  public  sector  in  several  states  and  municipalities.5  
  
Tax  System:  the  Dark  Side  of  Brazilian  Federalism  
  
As   shown   earlier,   the   changes   in   Brazilian   public   spending   are   key   to   the   current  
economic   development   of   Brazil.   The   impact   on   economic   development   was   mainly  
because  of  the  impact  of  public  spending  on  aggregate  demand.  Brazil  still  faces  major  
obstacles  to  expand  the  supply  of  goods  and  services.  As  a  result,  its  GDP  growth  is  still  
weak  when  compared   to  other   fast-­‐‑growing  nations   such  as  China  and   India.  Among  
the  various  constraints  facing  the  country  to  increase  its  GDP,  we  highlight  one:  the  tax  
system.    
The   Brazilian   social   welfare   system   created   after   the   1988   Constitution   is  
expensive  in  fiscal  terms.  From  1987  to  2008,  the  tax  burden  went  from  23.8%  to  34.8%  of  
the  GDP,  an   increase  of  43.21%.  Around  65%  of   tax   increases  are  due   to   federal   taxes,  
while   23.63%   are   due   to   increases   in   state   taxes,   and   10.90%   are   due   to   increases   in  
municipal  taxes  (Palos,  2011).  “Social  contributions”  (a  kind  of  federal  tax)  increased  in  
this  period  because  they  are  not  shared  with  subnational  governments.  As  a  result,  the  
weight  of  indirect  taxes  also  increased,  making  the  tax  system  more  regressive.  In  other  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5There is a lot of variation in federalism in the developed world. In terms of health policies, for example, Australia 
has many conditionalities for their transfer programs from the Federal government to States, while Germany adopts a 
more decentralized system and Canada leaves most of the big policy decisions to provincial governments (Banting 
and Corbett 2002).  
 








words,   Brazil’s   constitutional   finance   regulation   induces   the   federal   government   to  
increase  more  regressive  taxes.  
According  to  some  authors,   the  state  value-­‐‑added  tax  accounts   for  slightly  over  
half  of  all  indirect  taxes,  being  the  main  responsible  factor  for  the  regressivity  of  Brazil’s  
indirect   taxes   (Siqueira,  Nogueira,  &   Souza,   2010).   Indirect   taxes   are   regressive,   since  
they   tend   to  place   a  greater  burden  on  poorer  households.  The  poor   consume  a   large  
share  of  their  income,  instead  of  saving  or  investing  it.  Brazil   is   a   rare   case   of   a   federal  
country  where  the  largest  value-­‐‑added  tax  is  at  the  state-­‐‑level.  Brazil’s  uniqueness  raises  
a   series  of  problems,   for   instance,   the  “source/destination  problem”.  All  goods  have  a  
production   location   and   a   location   of   consumption.   Eventually,   a   commodity   can   be  
consumed  in  the  same  location  where  it  is  produced,  but  the  consumption  in  the  same  
location   is   not   the   rule  when  we   think  of   tradable   goods.   In   terms  of   equity,   the   best  
solution  would  be   to   tax   the   jurisdiction  of  consumption  because  consumers  are  more  
scattered   than   producing   centers.   Under   the   principle   of   symmetry   between   local  
contributions  and  local  public  spending,  the  destination  principle  is  the  most  desirable  
one  –  usually  who  bears  the  tax  burden  is  the  consumer,  once  companies  transfer  the  tax  
cost  onto  the  price  of  goods.  The  source  principle  implies  that  consumers  of  an  industry  
should  pay  a  tribute  to  the  jurisdiction  where  the  industry  is  located.  In  Brazil,  the  most  
industrialized   regions   are   the   richest   ones.   Source   taxation   is   a   type   of   hidden   inter-­‐‑
jurisdictional  transfer.  It  transfers  resources  from  poorer  and  rural  regions  to  richer  and  
more  industrialized  ones.  The  source  principle  has  at  least  one  advantage:  it  is  easier  to  
charge.  The  dilemma  does  not  exist  in  countries  where  value-­‐‑added  tax  is  at  the  national  
level.  Federal  government  levies  the  source  taxation  (where  it  is  easier)  and  redistributes  
within  the  destination  of  the  taxation  (where  it  is  fairer).  In  countries  that  have  a  federal  
value-­‐‑added  tax,  the  source  and  destination  jurisdiction  is  always  the  same:  the  national  
community.    








According   to   the   World   Bank’s   Doing   Business   project   (2013),   Brazil   is   the  
country  where   companies   have   the   highest   compliance   cost,   i.e.,   the   time   required   to  
prepare,  file  and  pay  taxes.  It  takes  2,600  hours  on  average  only  to  pay  taxes.6  More  than  
half   of   the   time   to   pay   taxes   in   Brazil   (1,374   hours)   is   due   to   state   value-­‐‑added   tax  
(Doing  Business,  2013).  As  the  state  value-­‐‑added  tax  is  partly  monitored  by  the  source  
state   and   partly   by   the   destination   state,   businesses   are   under   dual   authority   in  
interstate  transactions.  A  company  with  national  sales  must  deal  with  27  different  laws,  
one  for  each  state  (including  the  Federal  District).  In  general,  Brazilian  tax  laws  are  not  
uniform.  Often  a  law  from  one  state  conflicts  with  a  law  from  another  state.  Autonomy  
from   state   value-­‐‑added   tax   encourages   poorer   states   to   attract   investments   to   their  
jurisdictions  by  means  of  tax  exemptions.  Loser  states  counterattack  by  creating  special  
laws  to  nullify  the  effects  of  policies  promoted  by  poorer  states.  As  a  result,  the  system  




Brazil  has  been  successful  in  reducing  inequality  in  the  last  decade.  Many  have  argued  
that   it   is   difficult   to   balance   economic   growth   and   inequality   reduction   unless   the  
country  promotes  some  sort  of  technological  or  institutional  change.  Balancing  the  two  
desired  goals  seems  to  be  even  more  difficult  since  Brazil  is  a  federation.  Most  authors  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 “Time is recorded in hours per year. The indicator measures the time taken to prepare, file and pay 3 major types of 
taxes and contributions: the corporate income tax, value-added or sales tax, and labor taxes, including payroll taxes 
and social contributions. Preparation time includes the time to collect all information necessary to compute the tax 
payable and to calculate the amount payable. If separate accounting books must be kept for tax purposes—or 
separate calculations made—the time associated with these processes is included. This extra time is included only if 
the regular accounting work is not enough to fulfill the tax accounting requirements. Filing time includes the time to 
complete all necessary tax return forms and file the relevant returns at the tax authority. Payment time considers the 
hours needed to make the payment online or at the tax authorities. Where taxes and contributions are paid in person, 
the time includes delays while waiting”(Doing Business Methodology. Paying taxes 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology/paying-taxes).  
 








that   have   researched   the   relatively   unexplored   relationship   between   federalism   and  
inequality   believe   that   federalism   causes   inequality   (Wildasky,   1986;   Linz   &   Stepan,  
2000),   albeit   the   literature   is   not   uncontroversial   about   the   effect   of   federalism   on  
economic  growth  (Weingast,  1995;  Wibbels,  2000).  
In   this  paper,  we  explored   the   institutional  changes   in  Brazilian   federalism.  We  
argue  that  Brazil  has  reduced  inequality  by  spending  on  the  poor.  Social  programs  such  
as   Bolsa   Família   and   better   spending   on   education   have   helped  Brazil   to   decrease   its  
social  inequalities.  The  chaotic  and  inefficient  Brazilian  tax  system  is  still  an  obstacle  that  
has  to  be  overcome  for  Brazil  to  keep  its  growing  and  decreasing  inequality.    
Federal  transfers  (or  spending)  have  three  different  effects:  decreasing  inequality,  
preserving   the   status   quo,   and   increasing   inequality.   Bolsa   Família   and   spending   on  
education   helped   Brazil   to   reduce   inequality.   Unconditional   transfers   to   States   and  
municipalities  have  had  a  much  more  ambiguous  effect.  Finally,  the  Brazilian  tax  system  
is   still   favoring   the   richest   regions   and   individuals.   Brazilian   researchers   and   policy-­‐‑
makers   should   pay   careful   attention   to   the   consequences   of   the   cumbersome   and  
inefficient   tax   system   of   Brazil.   Similarly,   Brazil   should   either   design   better  
unconditional  transfers  so  as  to  promote  socioeconomic  equality,  or  get  rid  of  them  all  
together     
Replacing   federalism  by  other   forms  of  government   is  a  difficult   task.  The  1988  
Brazilian   Constitution   established   that   federalism   is   an   entrenched   clause.   In   other  
words,  replacing  federalism  in  Brazil  is  almost  impossible.  Replacing  federalism  is  also  
difficult   in   other   countries,   even   if   they   do   not   have   a   federal   entrenched   clause   as  
Brazilians   have.   It   requires   a   large   institutional   change   that   normally   happens   in  
transitional  periods  (either  to  democracy  or  to  dictatorship).  Knowing,  however,  that  a  
certain   form   of   government   creates   systematic   problems   is   useful   to   help   to  mitigate  
them.   This   is  why   it   is  more   useful   from   the   policy   point   of   view   to   discuss  ways   to  








reform   federalism   “from   inside”   than   theoretically   criticizing   federalism   without  
proposing  any  solution  to  solve  the  highlighted  problem.    
Figure   6   classifies   inter-­‐‑jurisdictional   transfers   according   to   our   typology   –  
inequality   reducing   transfers,   status   quo   maintaining   transfers,   and   inequality  
increasing  transfers.  Reforming  federal  monetary  transfers  (e.g.  Bolsa  Família)  is  one  of  
the  best  formulas  to  fight  inequality.  Similarly,  intergovernmental  transfers  on  spending  
with  high  social  and  economic  returns,  such  as  Brazilian  education  funds,  help  to  fight  
inequality.   In  addition,   there  are   transfers  such  as   the  ones   illustrated  by   the  Brazilian  
tax   system   that   perpetuate   inequalities.   In   sum,   reforming   Brazilian   institutions   is  
almost  mandatory  to  maintain  the  country  on  a  prosperous  path.  
  
Figure  6:  Evolution  of  Brazilian  Inter-­‐‑Jurisdictional  Transfers  through  Time  
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